Core Capability	Gap	Source
Planning	Continuity planning	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (8): "Maintain plans to ensure continuity of operations"
	Evaluating and updating plans	Protection FIOP: "Lessons learned will be integrated into plans, policies, and procedures as appropriate." (Page 34)
	Including individuals with disabilities or access/functional needs	National Protection Framework, Planning core capability: "Integrate planning for the whole community, including individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs..."
	Incorporating risk analyses	National Mitigation Framework, Planning core capability: "The planning process is a tool to integrate risk analysis."
	Integrating different plans	National Mitigation Framework, Planning core capability: "Integrating planning efforts across sectors, disciplines, and mission areas."
	Operational planning	National Prevention Framework, Planning core capability: "Planning includes crisis action planning," National Protection Framework, Operational Planning section: "Protection Operational Planning," National Mitigation Framework, Operational Planning section: "Mitigation Operational Planning."
	Pre-incident planning	National Response Framework, Planning core capability: "Develop all-hazards response plans prior to .. an incident."
	Strategic planning	National Protection Framework, Planning core capability: "The development of executable strategic … approaches."
	Whole community involvement and coordination	National Protection Framework, Planning core capability: "Conducting a systematic process that engages the whole community."
Public Information and Warning	Alerts and warnings	National Mitigation Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Warn people of the risks in their community," National Prevention Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Provide the public with advance notice."
	Culturally and linguistically appropriate messaging	National Protection Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Culturally and linguistically appropriate methods."
	Delivering actionable guidance	National Prevention Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Deliver prompt and actionable information."
	Developing standard operating procedures for public information	National Prevention Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Standardized procedures."
	Inclusiveness of the entire public	National Mitigation Framework: "Target messages to reach organizations representing children, individuals with disabilities or access and functional needs."
	New communications tools and technologies	Mitigation FIOP: "Use social media, Web sites (e.g., Ready.gov), and smartphone applications."
	Protecting sensitive information	National Prevention Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Protect information."
	Public awareness campaigns	National Prevention Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Increase public awareness," National Mitigation Framework, Public Information and Warning core capability: "Persuade the public."
	Traditional communications mechanisms	Mitigation FIOP: "more traditional mechanisms such as community meetings or ethnic media outlets."
	Allocating and mobilizing resources	National Response Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Mobilize all critical resources," National Protection Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Resource allocations."
	Command, control, and coordination	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Effective operational coordination provides for cohesive command and control in order to ensure coordination."
	Determining priorities, objectives, strategies	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Determine priorities, objectives, strategies."
	Emergency Operations Center management	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (14): "Establish command, control, and coordination structures"
	Ensuring information flow	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Facilitate effective intelligence and information sharing."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
Operational Coordination	Ensuring unity of effort	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Ensure unity of effort."
	Establishing a common operating picture	National Mitigation Framework: "Contribute to the situational awareness and a common operating picture."
	Ensuring continuity of government and essential services	Added Gap for 2018
	Establishing lines of communication	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Ensure clear lines and modes of communication."
	Establishing roles and responsibilities	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Define and communicate clear roles and responsibilities."
	NIMS/ICS compliance	National Response Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Enhance and maintain NIMS- compliant command, control, and coordination structures," National Mitigation Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Emphasize mitigation technique integration into Incident Command System (ICS)."
	Stakeholder engagement	National Prevention Framework, Operational Coordination core capability: "Collaborate with all relevant stakeholders."
Forensics and Attribution	Assessing terrorist capabilities	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Assess capabilities of perpetrating terrorists."
	Attribution assessments	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Interpret and communicate attribution results, confidence levels, and their significance."
	Biometric analysis	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Conduct forensic evidence examination, including biometric … analysis."
	CBRNE material analysis	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Conduct CBRNE material analysis."
	Crime scene preservation and exploitation	National Prevention Framework: "Preserve the crime scene and conduct site exploitation for intelligence collection."
	Digital media and network exploitation	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Conduct digital media and network exploitation."
	Evidence collection	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Forensics is the collection and examination of evidence."
	Forensic analysis	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Conduct forensic evidence examination."
	Terrorist investigations	National Prevention Framework, Forensics and Attribution core capability: "Conduct investigations to identify the perpetrator(s), conspirator(s), and sponsorship."
Intelligence and Information Sharing	Analysis of intelligence and information	National Protection Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "monitoring, gathering, and analysis of intelligence and information."
	Continuous threat assessment	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Assessment: Continually assess threat information."
	Developing reports and products	National Protection Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Produce and deliver relevant, timely, accessible, and actionable intelligence and information products."
	Disseminating intelligence and information	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Dissemination: Deliver finished intelligence and information products to the consumer and others as applicable."
	Establishing intelligence and information requirements	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Establish the intelligence and information requirements of the consumer."
	Exploiting and processing information	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Exploitation and Processing: Convert raw data into comprehensible information."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
	Feedback and evaluation	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Feedback and Evaluation: Acquire continual feedback during the intelligence cycle that aids in refining each individual stage and the cycle as a whole."
	Gathering intelligence	National Prevention Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Collection: Gather the required raw data to produce the desired finished intelligence and information products."
	Monitoring information	National Protection Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Monitor."
	Safeguarding sensitive information	National Protection Framework, Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability: "Adhere to appropriate mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive and classified information."
Interdiction and Disruption	Anti-terrorism operations	National Prevention Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Conduct anti-terrorism operations."
	Border security	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Enforcement of border authorities."
	CBRNE detection	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Detect ... CBRNE devices."
	CBRNE render safe	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Render safe CBRNE devices."
	Deterrent law enforcement presence	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Enhance the visible presence of law enforcement to deter or disrupt threats."
	Financial disruption	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Disrupt terrorist financing."
	Interdicting cargo, conveyances, and persons	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Interdict conveyances, cargo, and persons."
	Preventing acquisition of CBRNE	Prevention FIOP: "Prevent terrorist acquisition and transfer of CBRNE materials, precursors, and related technology." (Page 35)
	Tactical law-enforcement operations	National Prevention Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Implementing tactical law enforcement operations."
	Tracking and targeting terrorists and their weapons	National Prevention Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Targeting of persons or terrorist weapons."
	Wide-area search and detection	National Protection Framework, Interdiction and Disruption core capability: "Employ wide-area search and detection assets."
Screening, Search, and Detection	Biosurveillance	National Prevention Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "Conduct biosurveillance."
	Chemical and biological detection	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "CBRNE search and detection operations."
	Electronic search	National Prevention Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "Search databases and other information and intelligence sources."
	Explosives detection	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "CBRNE search and detection operations."
	Laboratory testing	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "These activities may include...laboratory testing."
	Locating terrorists	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "Locate persons and networks."
	Physical investigation	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: ""These activities may include…physical investigation."
	Promoting an observant nation	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "Develop and engage an observant Nation."
	Radiological and nuclear detection	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "CBRNE search and detection operations."
	Screening	National Protection Framework, Screening, Search, and Detection core capability: "Screen persons, baggage, mail, cargo, and conveyances...."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
	Wide-area search	National Prevention Framework: "Employ wide-area search and detection assets in targeted region."
Access Control and Identity Verification	Controlling cyber access	Protection FIOP: "Authorize, grant, or deny ... cyber access." (Page 63)
	Controlling physical access	Protection FIOP: "Authorize, grant, or deny physical ... access." (Page 63)
	Verifying identity	National Protection Framework, Access Control and Identity Verification core capability: "Verify identity."
Cybersecurity	Continuity of operations for cyber systems	DHS Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: "Core capabilities for the homeland security enterprise are … Continuity planning, giving consideration to facilities, personnel, equipment, software, data files, and system components through the use of commercial backup sites, service level agreements with hardware, software, and support vendors, and self-restoring services and systems."
	Controlling electronic access	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Unauthorized use."
	Detecting malicious activity	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Detect malicious activity."
	End-user awareness	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (9): "Implement risk-informed guidelines"
	Guidelines, regulations, and standards	Protection FIOP: "Implement risk-informed guidelines, regulations, and standards to ensure the security, reliability, integrity, and availability of critical information, records, and communications systems and services through collaborative cybersecurity initiatives and efforts." (Page 74)
	Investigating malicious actors	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Leverage law enforcement and intelligence assets to identify, track, investigate, disrupt, and prosecute malicious actors."
	Protective measures	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Implement countermeasures… to protect physical and cyber assets, networks, applications, and systems."
	Securing CIKR and SCADA systems	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Secure, to the extent possible, public and private networks and critical infrastructure (e.g., communication, financial, power grid, water, and transportation systems)."
	Sharing threat information	National Protection Framework: "Share actionable cyber threat information with the domestic and international, government, and 523 private sectors to promote shared situational awareness." (Page 17)
	Technical countermeasures	National Protection Framework, Cybersecurity core capability: "Implement countermeasures… to protect physical and cyber assets, networks, applications, and systems."
Physical Protective Measures	Biosecurity	National Protection Framework, Physical Protective Measures core capability: "Develop and implement biosecurity and biosafety programs and practices."
	Border protection	National Protection Framework, Physical Protective Measures core capability: "Protecting borders."
	Identifying and prioritizing assets to protect	National Protection Framework: "Identify and prioritize assets, systems, networks, and functions that need to be protected." (Page 18)
	Physical security measures	National Protection Framework: "Develop and implement risk-based physical security measures, countermeasures, policies, and procedures."
	Site-specific and process-specific risk assessments	Protection FIOP: "Identify needed physical protection, countermeasures, and policies through a risk assessment of key operational activities and infrastructure." (Page 64)
	Analysis tools	National Protection Framework, Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities core capability: "Obtain and use appropriate threat, vulnerability, and consequence tools."
	Data collection	National Protection Framework, Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities core capability: "Gather required data."
	Incorporating risk assessments in exercise design	National Protection Framework: "Use risk assessments to design exercises and determine the feasibility of mitigation projects and initiatives." (Page 19)

Core Capability	Gap	Source
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities	Risk assessment	National Protection Framework, Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities core capability: "analyze and assess risk and resilience," "Update risk assessments to reassess risk."
	Risk communication	NGP 2nd edition (10): maintain risk assessment processes"
	Risk management planning	National Protection Framework, Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities core capability: "Use risk assessments to…determine the feasibility of mitigation projects and initiatives."
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	Analysis of supply chain dependencies	National Protection Framework, Supply Chain Integrity and Security core capability: "Analyze key dependencies and interdependencies related to supply chain operations."
	Implementing countermeasures	National Protection Framework, Supply Chain Integrity and Security core capability: "Countermeasures."
	Implementing physical protection	National Protection Framework, Supply Chain Integrity and Security core capability: "Implement physical protections."
	Integrating security processes	Protection FIOP: "Integrate security processes into supply chain operations to identify items of concern and resolve them as early in the process as possible." (Page 90)
	Verification and detection	National Protection Framework, Supply Chain Integrity and Security core capability: "Use verification and detection capabilities to identify goods..."
Community Resilience	Collaborative planning and decision-making	National Mitigation Framework, Community Resilience core capability: "Collaboration: A broad engagement and ongoing dialogue about threats and vulnerabilities and meaningful, sustained participation in community planning and decision making."
	Communication and outreach	National Mitigation Framework: "Foster sustained communication, civic engagement" and "Convince community members of the value of mitigation for reducing the impact of disasters and the scale of response and recovery efforts." (Page 21)
	Education and skill building	National Mitigation Framework, Community Resilience core capability: "Education and Skill Building."
	Partnership building	National Mitigation Framework, Community Resilience core capability: "Partnership Building: The establishment of long-term relationships—well before, during, and after incidents—that support ongoing communication and awareness building, decision making, and the implementation of plans and decisions."
	Understanding the community	Mitigation FIOP: "Recognize the interdependent nature of the economy, health and social services, housing infrastructure, and natural and cultural resources within a community." (Page B-18); National Mitigation Framework: "Communicate and utilize the best available localized climate projections so that the public and private sectors can make informed decisions." and "Know the community's permanent and transient population demographics..." (Page 21);
Long-term Vulnerability Reduction	Adopting vulnerability reduction standards and building codes	National Mitigation Framework, Long-term Vulnerability Reduction core capability: "Establish standards and practices to reduce long-term vulnerability," "Adopt and enforce a suitable building code."
	Broadening the use of insurance	National Mitigation Framework, Long-term Vulnerability Reduction core capability: "Broaden the use of natural hazards and catastrophic insurance."
	Developing neighborhood civic organizations	National Mitigation Framework, Long-term Vulnerability Reduction core capability: "Initiating and maintaining neighborhood civic associations."
	Incorporating mitigation measures into construction and development	National Mitigation Framework, Long-term Vulnerability Reduction core capability: "Incorporate mitigation measures into construction and development projects that take into account future conditions."
	Individual and family preparedness	Mitigation FIOP: "Develop plans, and recognize that a prepared individual or family is the foundation of a resilient community." (Page B-27)
	Modeling and analysis	National Mitigation Framework, Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment core capability: "Analysis."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	Education and training	National Mitigation Framework, Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment core capability: "Education and Training."
	Obtaining and sharing data	National Mitigation Framework, Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment core capability: "Data."
Threats and Hazard Identification	Data collection and sharing	National Mitigation Framework, Threats and Hazard Identification core capability: "Gather required data in a timely and accurate manner."
	Estimating frequency and magnitude	Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide: "Consider two key factors: likelihood of incident and significance of threat/hazard effects."
	Modeling and analysis	National Mitigation Framework, Threats and Hazard Identification core capability: "Translate data into meaningful and actionable information through appropriate analysis and collection tools to aid in preparing the public."
	Stakeholder Collaboration/Coordination	National Mitigation Framework: "Build cooperation among private and public sectors by protecting internal interests but sharing threats and hazard identification resources and benefits." (Page 16)
Critical Transportation	Airspace management	Draft Response Framework (24): "Implement appropriate air traffic and airspace management measures."
	Debris removal	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (14): "Clear debris from any route type, (i.e., road, rail, airfield, port facility, waterway) to facilitate response operations"
	Delivery of response assets	National Preparedness Goal, Critical Transportation core capability: "The delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services to the affected areas."
	Establishing access	National Response Framework, Critical Transportation core capability: "Establish physical access through appropriate transportation corridors."
	Evacuation	National Preparedness Goal, Critical Transportation core capability: "the evacuation of people and animals."
	Reentering affected area	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (18): "transition into recovery for an affected area, and restore basic services and community functionality"
	Transportation safety and condition assessments	Response FIOP: "Conduct assessments of the condition and safety of transportation pathways and plan accordingly." (Page D-1-6)
Environmental Response/Health and Safety	Debris removal	Response FIOP, Environmental Response/Health and Safety tasks: "Monitor disposal of debris", "Coordinate with ESF #3 on the removal of debris (when classified as debris) affecting NCH resources."
	Decontamination	National Response Framework, ESF #10 annex: "Decontamination of buildings and structures."
	Environmental impact analysis	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (14): "Identify, evaluate, and implement measures to prevent and minimize impacts to the environment"
	Hazardous material clean-up	National Response Framework, Environmental Response/Health and Safety core capability: "Perform cleanup actions."
	Health and safety monitoring and assessment	National Response Framework, Environmental Response/Health and Safety core capability: "Conduct health and safety hazard assessments," "Assess, monitor."
	Predictive modeling	Response FIOP: "Coordinate the collection and sharing of predictive modeling data."
	Responder safety	National Response Framework, Environmental Response/Health and Safety core capability: "For response personnel."
	Survivor safety and assistance	National Response Framework, Environmental Response/Health and Safety core capability: "The affected population."
Fatality Management Services	Bereavement counseling	National Preparedness Goal, Fatality Management Services core capability: "Providing counseling to the bereaved."
	Body recovery	National Preparedness Goal, Fatality Management Services core capability: "Body recovery."
	Family reunification	National Preparedness Goal, Fatality Management Services core capability: "Reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
	Mortuary services	National Preparedness Goal, Fatality Management Services core capability: "Provide temporary mortuary solutions."
	Victim identification	National Preparedness Goal, Fatality Management Services core capability: "Victim identification."
Fire Management and Suppression	Structural firefighting	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities"
	Wildland firefighting	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities"
	Specialized firefighting	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities"
	Initial attack firefighting	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Provide traditional first response or initial attack firefighting services"
	Extended attack firefighting	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Conduct expanded or extended attack firefighting"
Infrastructure Systems	Communications systems	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Communications."
	Dams and flood control	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Dams," "flood control."
	Food production and delivery	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Food production and delivery."
	Government facilities	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Government facilities."
	Heating fuel provision	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Energy," 2012 SPR capability gap descriptions
	Hospitals	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Emergency services."
	Infrastructure site assessments	Response FIOP: "Perform site surveys and assessments " (Page C-5-7)
	Power restoration	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Energy," "utilities."
	Public recreation facilities	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Public recreation."
	Public safety facilities	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Physical facilities that support essential services, such as public safety."
	Sanitation	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Sanitation."
	Transportation infrastructure	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Transportation systems."
	Water treatment and provision	Recovery Framework, Infrastructure Systems RSF: "Water."
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Access to community staples	National Preparedness Goal, Public and Private Services and Resources core capability: "Access to community staples (e.g., grocery stores, pharmacies, and banks)."
	Donation management	Core Capability-TCL Crosswalk, Public and Private Services and Resources core capability: "Donations."
	Emergency power provision	National Preparedness Goal, Public and Private Services and Resources core capability: "Emergency power to critical facilities."
	Fuel support	National Preparedness Goal, Public and Private Services and Resources core capability: "Fuel support for emergency responders."
	Private resources	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Enhance public and private resource and services support for an affected area"
	Resource delivery	National Response Framework, Public and Private Services and Resources core capability: "Mobilize and deliver governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources."
	Resource management	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Mobilize and deliver governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources...moving and delivering resources and services "
	Resource tracking	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Mobilize and deliver governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources...moving and delivering resources and services "
	Supply chain restoration	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Restoration of impacted supply chains"
	Volunteer management	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (15): "Mobilize and deliver governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources"

| Core Capability	Gap	Source
Mass Care Services	Ensuring access	National Response Framework, Mass Care Services core capability: "Including individuals with access and functional needs."
	Family reunification	National Preparedness Goal, Mass Care Services core capability: "Support for reunifying families."
	Feeding	National Preparedness Goal, Mass Care Services core capability: "Feeding."
	Hydration	National Preparedness Goal, Mass Care Services core capability: "Hydration."
	Pets	National Response Framework, Mass Care Services appendix: "Federal departments and agencies also support the rescue, transportation, shelter, reunification, care, and essential needs of household pets displaced by disaster."
	Relocation assistance	National Response Framework, Mass Care Services core capability: "Provide relocation assistance."
	Resource distribution	National Response Framework, Mass Care Services core capability: "Move and deliver resources and capabilities."
	Sheltering	National Preparedness Goal, Mass Care Services core capability: "Sheltering."
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	Community-based search and rescue support	National Response Framework, Mass Search and Rescue Operations core capability: "Community-based search and rescue support operations."
	Rescue operations	National Response Framework, Mass Search and Rescue Operations core capability: "Rescue persons in distress."
	Search operations	National Response Framework, Mass Search and Rescue Operations core capability: "Conduct search," "to locate."
	Specialized operations	Typed Resource Definitions, Search and Rescue Resources (swift water, mine and tunnel)
	Synchronizing operations	National Response Framework, Mass Search and Rescue Operations core capability: "Ensure the synchronized deployment."
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	Law enforcement	Response FIOP: "Provide law enforcement functions, in support of local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area jurisdictions."
	Protecting response personnel	National Preparedness Goal, On-scene Security and Protection core capability: "For all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations."
	Securing disaster areas	National Preparedness Goal, On-scene Security and Protection core capability: "For people and communities located within affected areas."
Operational Communications	Communication between responders and the affected population	National Response Framework, Operational Communications core capability: "The affected populations."
	Data communications	National Response Framework, Operational Communications core capability: "Data communications."
	Interoperable communications between responders	National Response Framework: "Establish interoperable voice and data communications between local, state, tribal, territorial, and Federal first responders." (Page 23)
	Re-establishing communications infrastructure	National Response Framework, Operational Communications core capability: "Re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure."
	Re-establishing critical information networks	Draft Response Framework (26): "Re-establish critical information networks, including cybersecurity information-sharing networks
	Voice communications	National Response Framework, Operational Communications core capability: "Interoperable voice."
Public Health, Healtcare, and Emergency Medical Services	Definitive care	National Response Framework, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "Definitive care for those likely to survive their injuries."
	Emergency Medical Services	Core Capability-TCL Crosswalk, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "To provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility."
	Health assessments	National Response Framework, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "complete health assessments."
	Clinical laboratory testing	Core Capability-TCL Crosswalk, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "Laboratory testing."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
	Medical countermeasures	National Response Framework, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "Deliver medical countermeasures to exposed populations."
	Medical surge	National Response Framework, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "return medical surge resources to pre-incident levels."
	Public health interventions	Draft Response Framework (27): "Develop public health interventions to maintain and improve…"
	Triage and initial stabilization	National Response Framework, Public Health and Medical Services core capability: "Complete triage."
Situational Assessment	Analyzing information	National Response Framework, Situational Assessment core capability: "Enhanced information."
	Assessing hazard impacts	National Preparedness Goal, Situational Assessment core capability: "Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard."
	Delivering situation reports	National Response Framework, Situational Assessment core capability: "Deliver information."
	Stakeholder engagement	National Response Framework, Situational Assessment core capability: "Engage governmental, private, and civic sector resources."
	Tracking response activities	National Preparedness Goal, Situational Assessment core capability: "The status of the response."
Economic Recovery	Business/economic continuity planning	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (18):"Return affected area's economy within the specified time frame"
	Developing recovery objectives	Recovery FIOP: "Building common objectives for recovery." (Page B-4)
	Developing the workforce	Recovery Framework, Economic RSF: "Workforce development initiatives are in place."
	Disseminating information	Recovery Framework, Economic RSF: "Private and public sector actors have information they need to make informed decisions about recovery."
	Economic impact assessments	Recovery FIOP: "Reviewing and monitoring economic impact assessments." (Page B-5)
	Incentivizing entrepreneurial and business development	Recovery Framework, Economic RSF: "Entrepreneurial and business development initiatives are in place."
	Management planning	Recovery Framework, Economic RSF: "Management plans ensure that the most effective use of Federal funds is in place."
	Reopening businesses	Recovery Framework, Economic RSF: "Reopening businesses and/or establishing new businesses."
Health and Social Services	Behavioral health	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Behavioral health."
	Determining health and social needs	Recovery FIOP: "Complete an assessment of community H&SS needs."
	Ensuring access	Recovery FIOP: "Restore basic H&SS functions; identify critical areas of need for H&SS, as well as key partners and individuals with disabilities, populations with LEP, and others with access and functional needs in short-term, intermediate, and long-term recovery." (Page C-1)
	Environmental health	Recovery FIOP: "Identification and mitigation of public health threats ... that can cause or exacerbate negative environmental health outcomes." (Page C-4)
	Food safety	Recovery FIOP: "Provision of technical assistance to the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to ensure the safety of the Nation's supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products." and "Assessment of an impacted community's food supply networks to ensure food safety." (Page C-4)
	Health assessment	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Conducts Federal Health and Social Services RSF assessments with primary agencies."
	Healthcare facilities and coalitions	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Health care facilities and coalitions."
	Medical products and services	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Medical services."
	Public awareness	Recovery FIOP: "Development and issuance of consistent public messaging and risk communications."

Core Capability	Gap	Source
	Public health measures	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "restoration of the public health"; Recovery FIOP: "Implementation of strategies to assess and monitor the public health, disease surveillance, and injury prevention of the impacted community in order to identify and mitigate health problems." (Page C-3)
	Response and recovery worker health	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Particularly the needs of response and recovery workers."
	School impacts	Recovery FIOP: "Support as appropriate, the restoration of the educational environment for students and staff in impacted communities." and "Support state, territorial, tribal, or local government efforts to coordinate enrollment, educational services, and H&SS for students that are homeless and/or displaced prior to, or as a result of, the disaster." (Page C-5)
	Social services	Recovery Framework, Health and Social Services RSF: "Essential social services needs."
Housing	Addressing housing shortages	Recovery FIOP: "Lack of affordable housing in the impacted and nearby areas means that even minor damages to housing stock can result in significant housing gaps. This issue becomes even more critical following a disaster, where pre-existing gaps are widened and communities can face severe shortages." (Page D-4)
	Housing accessibility	Draft Recovery Framework (31): "Address accessible…housing needs in community planning efforts."
	Housing affordability	Draft Recovery Framework (31): "Address affordable…housing needs in community planning efforts."
	Housing assessments	Recovery FIOP, Housing RSF: "Assess preliminary housing impacts and needs". Recovery FIOP: "FEMA will provide the Housing RSF with available data regarding initial housing impacts and provision of short-term and interim housing under the NRF. This would include a summary and ongoing updates on Preliminary Damage Assessments". Sandy AAR: "FEMA conducts Preliminary Damage Assessments with state and local officials to identify the impact, type, and extent of disaster damages and the resources needed for the affected community to recover."
	Reconstruction of destroyed housing	Recovery Framework, Housing RSF description: "Reconstruction and new construction."
	Rehabilitation of damaged housing	Recovery Framework, Housing RSF description: "Housing repair, rehabilitation."
	Transition from interim to permanent/long-term housing	National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (19): "Ensure community housing recovery plans continue to address interim housing needs, assess options for permanent housing"
Natural and Cultural Resources	Damage assessment	Recovery Framework, Natural and Cultural Resources RSF description: "Natural and cultural assessments and studies needed post-disaster."
	Environmental preservation and restoration	Recovery Framework, Natural and Cultural Resources RSF description: "Environmental planning," "The preservation, protection, conservation, rehabilitation, recovery and restoration of natural and cultural resources during recovery."
	Historic preservation	Recovery Framework, Natural and Cultural Resources RSF description: "Historic preservation."

THIRA Target Crosswalk with Community Lifelines and Recovery Support Functions

Lifeline	Capability Target
Food, Water, Sheltering	Infrastructure Systems: Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore service to (#) customers without water service.
	Infrastructure Systems: Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore service to (#) customers (without wastewater service).
	Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Within (#) (time) of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to (#) people requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain distribution system for (#) (time).
	Mass Care Services: Within (#) (time) of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for (#) people requiring shelter, food, and water, including (#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter, food, and water), and (#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for (#) (time).
	Mass Care Services: Within (#) (time) of an incident, move (#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including (#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing.
Health and Medical	Fatality Management Services: Within (#) (time) of an incident, complete the recovery and provide temporary storage services, for (#) fatalities.
	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services: Within (#) (time) of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility (#) people requiring medical care.
Transportation	Critical Transportation: Within (#) (time) of an incident, clear (#) miles of road affected, to enable access for public, private, and non-profit emergency responders.
Communications	Operational Communications: Within (#) (time) of an incident, establish interoperable communications across (#) jurisdictions affected and with (#) partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for (#) (time).
	Infrastructure Systems: Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore service to (#) customers (without communication service).

THIRA Target Crosswalk with Community Lifelines and Recovery Support Functions

	Public Information & Warning: Within (#) (time) notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to (#) people affected, including (#) people with access and functional needs (affected) and (#) people with limited English proficiency affected.
Safety and Security	**Critical Transportation:** Within (#) (time) notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of (#) people requiring evacuation, including (#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation).
	Fire Management & Suppression: Within (#) (time) of an incident, conduct fire fighting operations to suppress and extinguish (#) structure fires.
	Mass Search and Rescue: Within (#) (time) of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for (#) people requiring rescue.
	On-scene Security, Protection, & Law Enforcement: Within (#) (time) of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and (#) people affected.
	Operational Coordination: Within (#) (time) of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across (#) jurisdictions affected and with (#) partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for (#) (time).
	Planning: Within every (#) (time), update all emergency operations plans that define the roles and responsibilities of (#) partner organizations involved in incident management across (#) jurisdictions affected, and the sequence and scope of tasks needed to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from events.
	Situational Assessment: Within (#) (time) of incident, and on a (#) (time) cycle thereafter, provide notification to leadership across (#) jurisdictions affected and (#) partner organizations involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for (#) (time).
Energy (Power & Fuel)	**Infrastructure Systems:** Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore service to (#) customers (without power service).
Hazardous Material	**Environmental Response/Health & Safety:** Within (#) (time) of an incident, assess, contain, and begin cleaning up hazardous material releases from (#) hazmat release sites.
	Environmental Response/Health & Safety: Within (#) (time) of a hazmat incident, complete decontamination procedures for (#) exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents).

THIRA Target Crosswalk with Community Lifelines and Recovery Support Functions

Lifeline	Capability Target
Infrastructure Systems	*All 4 infrastructure systems targets are covered under the following lifeline sectors:* • *Communications* • *Energy (Power and Fuel)* • *Food, Water, Sheltering*
Housing	<u>Housing</u>: Within (#) (time) of an incident, (#) people requiring long-term housing, including (#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing.
Health & Social Services	<u>Health & Social Services</u>: Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore functions at (#) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations.
Economic Recovery	<u>Economic Recovery</u>: Within (#) (time) of an incident, reopen (#) businesses closed due to the incident.
Natural and Cultural Resources	<u>Natural and Cultural Resources</u>: Within (#) (time) of an incident, restore (#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction.

THIRA/SPR Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Introduction

This document captures questions frequently asked by stakeholders about the THIRA/SPR process and requirements, as well as the answers that FEMA has developed in response. Please note that FEMA is continuously updating and adding to this document as new questions arise. If you have a question or would like to recommend a question for inclusion in this document, please email the THIRA/SPR Help Desk at FEMA-SPR@fema.dhs.gov.

Contents

THIRA FAQ

THIRA Step 1 Questions

1. How many threats and hazards are communities required to select for THIRA Step 1?

- FEMA does not require communities to identify a specific number of threats or hazards in THIRA Step 1. Communities develop a list of plausible community-specific threats and hazards that would present the greatest challenge for the 32 core capabilities. This does not mean that communities need to identify 32 threats or hazards. Each hazard should be the greatest stressor of at least one core capability, but a single threat or hazard may present the greatest challenge to multiple core capabilities. The ideal number of threats and hazards will vary based on the specific risk profiles of each community.

THIRA Step 2 Questions

2. Are communities required to develop an estimate for every standardized impact for every threat or hazard?

- No, communities are not required to complete every standardized impact for every threat or hazard. However, they must address each standardized impact at least once across all included threats and hazards.

3. What kind of information and level of detail should we include in a context description?

- Context descriptions should include critical details such as location, magnitude, time, and other factors that might affect the size of an impact to the community. It is also important to include any social or physical vulnerabilities that make the threat or hazard of particular concern. FEMA encourages communities to provide as much detail as is reasonable and necessary to fully contextualize the threat or hazard.

4. For one of the standardized impacts, we do not have a threat or hazard selected that would result in an impact estimate (for example, the number of customers without wastewater service). How should we resolve this issue?

- We suggest that you modify one or more of your existing scenarios so that they include impacts for the number of customers without wastewater service or create an additional scenario that includes this impact. Your community must estimate each impact at least once during your THIRA process.

5. What information should a community include if they desire to add impacts in addition to the required standardized impacts?

- The optional impacts can be any additional quantitative or qualitative impacts the community would like to consider as they assess their capabilities. Communities will be able to easily reference these additional, non-required impacts in the tool they use to complete and submit their THIRA/SPR as they develop their capability targets.

- In addition, communities can also describe other impacts as part of their context descriptions (e.g. cascading effects).

6. Will FEMA provide definitions for terminology and specific standardized impacts?

- Yes, FEMA has provided communities with additional guidance to help them complete their THIRA and SPR, including definitions of key terms. This guidance includes an updated version of Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 and an annotated sample THIRA and SPR, which provides additional explanations of the standardized targets and how communities may interpret them.
- FEMA also released definitions for the standardized impacts, providing guidance for how communities can define and interpret them which communities can access on the [Workshop Resources](#) page of Prep Toolkit. However, if a community decides that using a different interpretation of a particular standardized impact would make their THIRA/SPR data more useful, they should feel free to do so. Communities can use the free-text fields in either Step 2 of the THIRA or Step 1 of the SPR to provide any desired context on how they interpreted the standardized impacts.

7. When considering which threat or hazard most challenges each target, should we consider our largest threat or hazard impacts or the most challenging impacts?

- CPG-201 requires communities to estimate their most challenging impact for every standardized impact. The impact with the largest number is often, but not always, the most challenging to address. For example, it may be more challenging to provide medical care to a smaller number of individuals affected by a radiological attack (which may include additional considerations like decontamination or personal protective equipment) than a larger number of hurricane survivors. In cases where the largest impact and most challenging impact differ, communities should estimate both of those impacts in THIRA Step 2, and use the free-text field in THIRA Step 3 ("Provide any additional context necessary to understand why you expect the threat or hazard identified to most challenge your ability to achieve this capability target.") to explain why the impact is most challenging despite not being the biggest.

8. How can we best estimate the number of people affected?

- The number of people affected is defined as the total number of individuals who were negatively affected within the incident area by direct or cascading impacts. These impacts can include injuries, power outages, exposure to hazardous materials, etc. This impact also includes populations with access or functional needs. Modeling tools like [Hazus](#) can be useful for estimating the number of individuals affected, and if the scenario you are using is based on a historical event, data inventories like [OnTheMap for Emergency Management](#) may also have numbers for the affected population.

9. Is there a standard for calculating the number of people with access and functional needs within an area?

- A good rule of thumb is 20% of the total population of an area (based on Census Bureau estimates) but other approaches for estimating the number of individuals with access and functional needs exist.
    - If you are trying to get numbers for a specific area of your state, territory, tribe, or urban area, you can use estimates of the number of people who are disabled and people with limited English-language abilities (at the county level) from U.S. Census Data. American FactFinder provides American Community Survey five-year estimates. There are a lot of data layers in this tool, but we recommend using the "Selected Social Characteristics in the United States" table (ID# DP02). This data table provides information not only on the number of people with disabilities or with limited English-language abilities, but also marital status, number of households, educational attainment, etc.
    - If you are estimating this impact for a scenario based on a historical event, then this information should be more accurate and easier to obtain using tools such as the Hurricane Journal and OnTheMap for Emergency Management.

10. We are struggling to estimate the miles of road that would need to be cleared of debris due to a lack of data. Do you have any suggestions for developing that estimate?

- With limited resources, one way that you may be able to model the estimated miles of road that you would need to clear is by using GIS tools. For example, in ArcGIS (a common GIS tool that may be available to you), you can use the geoprocessing tool and the "clip" feature within that to determine the total miles of highway, major roads, local roads, and minor roads within a defined location. There are numerous data layers of major roads and highway systems in the United States in ArcGIS online that you can use. If you know your scenario's impacted area, you can use this to define the area to clip.
    - This will count **all** miles of roads in the defined area, which will likely be an overestimate of the actual number of miles that you would need to clear, but this is a useful starting point for an estimate.

11. We are finding it challenging to estimate potential impacts to natural and cultural resources due to a lack of data. Do you have any suggestions for developing that estimate?

- FEMA recommends looking at the scenarios in your THIRA and considering which of them would impact the highest number of registered historic places in your community (you may be able to use mapping or modeling tools to help with this; a list of those is available on the Workshop Resources page on Prep Toolkit). If you can overlay the path/impact zone of the disaster (e.g. a hurricane) with the locations of historic places (you could include those that have formally registered with your community, plus any others you think might be especially important to the community as a whole), that would give you a sense of how many could be affected.

12. When estimating an impacts value for (#) personnel in THIRA Step 2, which standardized impact does this refer to?

- When estimating the (#) *personnel* in THIRA Step 2, this value refers to (#) *personnel assigned to support follow-up interdiction and disruption activities that may be*

undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband, which appears in the Interdiction and Disruption standardized target.

- – For additional information on the new Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation standardized targets, refer to Question 9 of General THIRA/SPR questions below, or to the THIRA/SPR Target Reporting Requirements Matrix located on the Workshop Resources page of Prep Toolkit.

THIRA Step 3 Questions

12. Is the capability target set under the updated methodology indicative of the level to which a community intends to build?

- Yes. The updated methodology requires communities to set capability targets to capture the level of capability they realistically seek to build to or sustain, over whatever period of time they feel is appropriate for their community. This level of capability should be informed by the estimated standardized impacts of the community's threats and hazards, but capability targets do not have to address the full extent of those standardized impacts.
- At their discretion, communities also have the option to set "maximum requirements," which capture the level of capability they believe would be required to fully address the impacts of a "plausible worst-case scenario." By "plausible worst-case scenario," FEMA means: "of the full range of incidents that could realistically affect a community, those which would present the most challenging impacts."

13. Is there only one standardized target per core capability?

- While most core capabilities have only a single standardized target, FEMA has set more than one required standardized target for four core capabilities: Infrastructure Systems (four targets), Critical Transportation (two targets), Environmental Response/Health and Safety (two targets), and Mass Care Services (two targets). A breakdown of all of the required standardized targets and associated standardized impacts can be found on the Workshop Resources page of Prep Toolkit.
- FEMA received feedback from many communities on the quality of the proposed standardized targets, and in certain cases, they rated multiple standardized targets highly for the same core capability. In those cases where the highly rated targets cover different unique tasks, the core capability has more than one standardized target.
- Communities can also optionally add any additional targets to their THIRA if they wish, but these are not required. If desired, communities will also be able to evaluate their capabilities against these optional targets.

14. What should we base our capability targets on? What are some considerations for setting capability targets?

- Communities should reflect on several factors when considering the level of capability they should build to and sustain, including but not limited to potential threat and hazard impacts and their likelihood, the resources available to the community, and the community's priorities for building and sustaining different capabilities.
- For example, if there is a 1 in 1,000 chance a community will experience a threat or hazard that requires it to shelter 10,000 people, and a 1 in 200 chance it will experience

a threat or hazard that requires it to shelter 1,000 people, if that community has limited resources and competing priorities (and every community generally does), it may only want to actually build and sustain the capacity to shelter 1,000 people. If that 1 in 1,000 event happens, it would need support from outside the community. Otherwise, if the community invests in the capacity to shelter 10,000 people, that shelter space may sit idle most of the time. That represents an opportunity cost, as the community could have invested those resources in building and/or sustaining other capabilities.

- This example is just one way of looking at this and may not reflect how all communities approach their targets. Some communities may determine it's appropriate to build and sustain their capabilities to the level necessary to address their most severe potential impacts (their maximum requirement), even if impacts on that scale are not likely to occur very frequently. However, most communities will likely not have the resources to build and sustain all of their capabilities to this level, and will have to prioritize.

15. Are communities able to set the timeframes/units of time in the standardized targets or will FEMA provide them?

- Communities identify the timeframes (including the units of time, such as hours, days, weeks, etc.) in which they want to accomplish the activity described in the standardized targets.

16. How can we estimate data points for things that are very situation-specific and bound by the timeframe metric?

- The purpose of the timeframe metrics in the standardized targets is to determine the optimal period of time to accomplish a goal or action. Once the timeframe is established, communities should identify what they can do, or want to be able to do, during that specific timeframe. The timeframe metric helps to frame the rest of the conversation.

17. What are some considerations to keep in mind when setting timeframe metrics?

- Communities should be strategic and deliberate about the timeframe metrics that they use in their capability targets, selecting timeframes that are operationally relevant and useful for the capability they are using each target to measure.
- For example, let's say a community sets a THIRA target for evacuating 1,200,000 people within 96 hours. The community then estimates that it can currently evacuate 1,200,000 people within that timeframe. That would indicate no gap in capability, but is 96 hours fast enough to complete evacuation, given the threats and hazards that the community may face? What if an event takes place that requires them to evacuate in 24 hours, an event where the community wouldn't have 96 hours to work with? In that kind of scenario, despite reporting no gap in capability, the community could nonetheless encounter some serious challenges. The number of people the community can evacuate in 96 hours is arguably operationally irrelevant if that's past the point of safe evacuation and the community needs to be able to evacuate people within 24 hours.
- Conversely, if a community sets its target for evacuating 1,200,000 people within 6 hours and reports it can currently evacuate 120,000 within that timeframe, that indicates a 90% gap between its current capability and its target. But is that more of a function of a significant capability gap, or of a timeframe metric that's too short? If a community is

unlikely to ever need to complete evacuation within a 6-hour timeframe, it's more likely to be the latter.

- Communities should also consider how even relatively smaller differences in timeframes can affect how they measure their capability gaps. For example, a community might set a target of evacuating 1,200,000 people within 18 hours and estimate it can currently evacuate 600,000 people within that timeframe. That would indicate a 50% gap between its current capability and its target. But what if by adding just 6 more hours to that timeframe (bringing it to 24 hours), they could cut that gap in half to 25% (able to evacuate 900,000 within that 24-hour timeframe)? Depending on how quickly the community needs to be able to evacuate, the estimates based off a 24-hour timeframe may provide a more accurate indication of the community's actual capability gap in this area.
- Communities should consult with response planners, who can help them set operationally appropriate timeframes for several capability targets. Planning factors and exercise objectives may already indicate how quickly the community plans to deliver certain capabilities during an incident.

18. Can we modify the new standardized targets to account for unique situations/targets for communities to meet?

- Communities will not be able to modify the standardized targets beyond setting community-specific target numbers. However, communities will continue to have the opportunity to set any additional targets that they feel are important, beyond the required standardized targets.

19. For a target that includes "impending incident" (i.e. Critical Transportation: Evacuation functional area), does that mean that the target only applies to incidents with warning times, rather than no-notice events?

- No, this target is not intended to be limited to only notice events or pre-event evacuation.

20. Are there any best practices or shortcuts for identifying the threat or hazard that most stresses each target without having to estimate every standardized impact for each target?

- While FEMA only requires you to develop one estimate for every standardized impact (based on the most challenging threat/hazard for that impact), it can be beneficial to develop multiple estimates for standardized impacts based on different threats/hazards. However, if you don't have the bandwidth to do this, there is an approach you can try which may reduce the level of effort.
  - Gather a group of emergency managers or subject-matter experts and as a working group, go through the list of all threats and hazards you have included in THIRA Step 1. Then, read through each standardized impact in THIRA Step 2 and ask the question "Could this *potentially* be the greatest stressor of this impact?". If the group says "yes" to one, or several threats/hazards, then those are the ones that you should consider gathering impact data for. This can help narrow down that list of threats and hazards to gather relevant impact data for instead of trying to gather data for all of them.

- The THIRA Template Toolkit is an Excel tool that can assist communities in selecting the threat or hazard that most stresses each target. It is available for download on the [Workshop Resources](#) page of Prep Toolkit.

SPR FAQ

SPR Step 1 Questions

1. In Step 1 of the SPR are you looking only for capability that is supported by Federal grant funding, or overall capability regardless of funding?

- Step 1 of the SPR asks communities to assess their overall capability—and any changes in the capability over the past year—regardless of whether the capability is funded by Federal, state, local sources, or private sources. In Step 3 of the SPR, communities indicate the degree to which each funding source played a role in the sustainment and building of the capability.

2. What are FEMA's expectations about the accuracy and precision of the capability estimates in SPR Step 1?

- FEMA does not expect actuals (unless a community happens to have exercised the capability they're measuring very recently or used it during an actual disaster); FEMA only expects the best estimates communities can come up with based on the information they have, which in some cases may simply be educated guesses from subject matter experts. FEMA is not necessarily expecting to see an overly-precise number such as "I can currently shelter exactly 5,431 people." That level of precision may not be feasible with the information communities have available, and that is completely acceptable. In most cases, FEMA expects to see numbers like 5,000 or maybe 5,500—an estimate that's in the right "ballpark".

- Estimating capabilities in the THIRA/SPR is fundamentally a planning exercise. Coming up with these kinds of estimates is an inherent part of planning. When we develop plans, even for specific threats or hazards, we know going into it that the scenario we include in our plan and the scenario we actually face are likely to be quite different. For example, the estimated impacts in our plan may be quite different from the actual impacts of a disaster. But that doesn't mean that planning isn't a worthwhile activity. The value of planning isn't in perfectly predicting the future, it's thinking and talking through what could happen and what we can do about that.

- This is also a big part of the value of the THIRA/SPR. The purpose of coming up with capability estimates is not to get a 100 percent accurate representation of what communities can do during a disaster. It's to conduct a process and produce information that is useful for planning discussions, that represents the communities' best estimates of what they can do, and that will help them understand what data they can collect in the future to improve their estimations.

3. How do we convey a range of current capability? Why would we want to provide a range of current capability?

- FEMA understands that there are several factors and variables that can affect what capabilities a community is able to deliver in a given situation. For example, the number

of people a community can shelter in an earthquake scenario may be very different from the number of people a community is able to shelter in a flooding scenario.

- In the SPR, there is an optional field for communities to provide additional context. In that field, communities can indicate if their estimate of their current capability is most accurately expressed as a range and indicate some of the factors and variables that can affect what they are able to deliver. For example, a community may be confident that the number of people they are able to shelter is between 8,000 and 12,000, but various factors may affect the number that community is able to shelter in a specific situation. In some circumstances, it may be closer to the higher or lower end of that range. When communities estimate their current capability in SPR Step 1, they should select the number within that range that they think will generally be the most accurate in most cases. For example, the community may determine that in most scenarios they'd be able to shelter 11,000 people, even if in some scenarios they'd be able to shelter more or less than that. If a community is uncertain where within their range they will most typically fall, they can report the median of their range and explain this in the free-text field for additional context.

- For example, a community may estimate that they can extinguish 140 structure fires within 24 hours of an incident. However, they could also indicate in the free text box that they feel more confident in a broader range of capability. For example, "Although we indicated that we could extinguish 140 structure fires, we are not that confident in that specific estimate and therefore reported a 3 in the confidence assessment. However, we are more confident that we can extinguish between 120-160 structure fires within 24 hours of an incident."

4. How do you define capability built, sustained, and lost?

- **Lost:** In some cases, a capability may be completely lost, but in many cases a capability may only partially degrade, such as a team being temporarily offline due to equipment shortfalls. In the SPR, communities track current operational capabilities, and a capability should be considered lost if it was operational at the time of the last SPR submission but is no longer operational at the time of the current submission.
- **Sustained:** Existing capabilities that have not been lost over the last year have been sustained. If a capability was operational at the time of the previous SPR submission and is still operational at the time of the current submission it should be considered sustained, even if that capability was not operational for the entire preceding year.
- **Built:** Capabilities Built are new capabilities that were not operational during the prior year. This can occur for several reasons: 1) because the capability did not exist during the prior year; 2) because the capability was under development during the prior year; or 3) because the capability had partially degraded during the prior year and needed to be brought back on-line.

5. Are we expected to include information in the "Beginning Capability" field for 2018 since this is our first year completing the new methodology?

- While FEMA does require communities to provide a Beginning Capability in 2018, communities may approach this question a bit differently in 2018 than they will in subsequent years. Rather than starting the SPR capability assessment with the Beginning Capability, communities can choose to first estimate their Current Capability

and then consider the changes that occurred over the past year to get to that point, working backwards to develop an estimate of what their capability was at the beginning of the year. More information on determining your Beginning Capability can be found in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201, 3rd Edition.

▪ Another approach that communities can take is to estimate their current capability as of May, when the Excel-based Whole Community Input Form was released, and track their built, sustained, and lost capability between May and December 2018 to determine their first year Beginning and Current Capabilities.

6. This is the first year that we've had to estimate how much we've built, sustained, and lost capability over the past year. How should we come up with these estimates, especially without an estimate of last year's capability to use as a reference point?

▪ FEMA doesn't expect that communities have been tracking how they've built, sustained, or lost capability in those exact terms over the past year. However, communities should consider what investments they've made in planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises over the past year. Likewise, communities can consider losses in these areas and what estimate what impact that has had on their overall ability to deliver capabilities. This can help to frame discussions with stakeholders and subject-matter experts about how, and to what extent, these investments have helped communities build and sustain their capabilities, as well as how losses in these areas have resulted in reductions in capability.

▪ For example, if a community utility company recently conducted a training for its power restoration crew, the community would first consider if this training helped the community to maintain an existing capacity to restore power or represents an actual increase in capability. Next, the community would consider to what extent this training helped them to maintain or increase their capability. It might be more helpful to think about this as a percentage rather than as a specific number and frame the discussion with stakeholders and SMEs around that. For example, if the community thinks that this training will increase their capacity by roughly ten percent, and they estimated it was able to restore power to 10,000 customers in two weeks at the beginning of the year, then they can estimate that they added the capability to restore power to an additional 1,000 customers in a two-week timeframe.

  – Depending on your community, it may be easier to consider all of the investments made in building a capability collectively first before estimating the extent to which they improved capacity, rather than evaluating the estimated impact of individual investments or activities. For example, there may be a variety of different activities and investments that supported power restoration last year, and it may be easier to consider their collective impact on your capability rather than examine them all individually.

▪ Communities will need to interpret how investments in planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises resulted in changes to capability. They should leverage expert knowledge and opinion, ideally grounded in data like recent investments in building and sustaining capabilities, but such data might not always be available. FEMA researched methods that the private sector, intelligence community, and academia use to develop similar types of estimates when data is not readily available (although referencing data can be very helpful when using any of these approaches).

FEMA recorded a webinar (https://fema.connectsolutions.com/pkhijitdnm3m/) laying out three separate methods for estimation of various data points in the THIRA/SPR process, including estimates of how capabilities have increased, decreased, or been maintained over the course of the past year. Each of the three methods vary by how communities engage stakeholders, including in-person or email-based approaches. The slides for that webinar are available on the Workshop Resources page of Prep Toolkit.

7. Will we need to provide documentation as proof of capabilities that we have lost, sustained, or built?

- No, FEMA does not require communities to provide additional documentation to support their SPR assessment. The new methodology incorporates free-text boxes where communities are required to explain how each capability was lost, sustained, or built, but FEMA will not require any additional documentation to corroborate that information. If communities want to note how they arrived at their estimate to assist with the completion of the next year's assessment, they can provide that information in free-text box next to the confidence ratings. Please also indicate what sources you used to develop your estimates in the THIRA and SPR where prompted to do so in your assessment.

8. When we are assessing capabilities, would it be appropriate to use similar nearby communities for data and comparison?

- When estimating standardized impacts, this would certainly be a useful approach to inform your levels of impact and need. For other data points, like current capability, using nearby communities as a starting point may be a good idea, but it is important to look at the differences between communities. Ultimately, if your community feels that this is a useful approach to achieve accurate results, then you are encouraged to assess capabilities in this way and explain your process in the associated free-text box.

9. How should we estimate capability lost, sustained, and built for the Planning standardized target, as those impacts (number of partner organizations involved in incident management and number of jurisdictions affected) do not really seem to lend themselves to that kind of analysis?

- The target for Planning assumes that communities have a number of jurisdictions and partner organizations that they anticipate will either be affected by the threat/hazard or will coordinate with them in response to the threat/hazard. Ideally, planning for that event (or a broader Emergency Operations Plan [EOP]) would be comprehensive and involve those jurisdictions and partner organizations in either the planning process for one plan, or as partners in a coordinated series of state and local plans.
    - If you are focused on an EOP, then you are measuring how many of those partner organizations and jurisdictions were involved in the planning process the last time you updated your EOP.
    - Another possible approach would be to report how many of the jurisdictions affected had updated their EOP over the last year (or whatever the appropriate timeframe is).
- As for how to measure lost, sustained, and built for those standardized impacts:
    - If the last time you updated your EOP you involved 10 jurisdictions, any of those jurisdictions that stayed involved the next time are *sustained*. Any new

participants would be *built* and any former participants that no longer participated would be *lost*.

- The same is true for jurisdictions updating their plans. Any jurisdictions that updated their plan last time and did so again would be *sustained*, any jurisdiction that did not update last time but did this time would be *built*, and any jurisdictions that updated last time but did not update this time would be *lost*.

10. How much should a scenario's context play a role in our capability assessment? For example, for Fire Management & Suppression, we want to extinguish 15 structure fires within 48 hours. This seems like an easy task, but in our most stressful scenario for that target they are all extra-alarm fires and take place during a blizzard, making it more challenging. Should we factor in the specifics of the most challenging scenario when completing the SPR?

- There are two acceptable approaches for estimating your current capabilities, and the approach that works best for you likely depends on the specifics of your community and how it plans for disasters. One approach is to estimate your community's general level of capability, without factoring in any specific scenario. This approach may make more sense for smaller communities, where the location of capabilities may be less of a factor during an incident. The other approach is to estimate your community's capability during the scenario that would most challenge that capability. That approach may make more sense for larger communities, where the location of an incident can have greater implications for the availability and relevance of capabilities (e.g. shelters). Ultimately, you should adopt whatever approach will be most useful for your community's planning efforts. However, please do indicate the approach you used in the free-text field next to the confidence ratings in the SPR.
- Please note that if you chose a smaller impact number in THIRA Step 2 because the circumstances are particularly challenging in that scenario (compared to other scenarios that may have bigger numbers but would be less challenging to manage), then that scenario is likely to be an important consideration for your capability assessment.

11. We have a cyber-attack/power outage scenario with cascading impacts, resulting in the disruption of wastewater services for 2.5 million customers for up to a week. The restoration of wastewater services is completely dependent on resolving the cyber-attack/power outage issue first and has little to do with the work of our water reclamation district. Should we complete the SPR for the wastewater target in the mindset of our water reclamation district or in the mindset of our cyber/power outage teams?

- We suggest that for the quantitative aspects of SPR Step 1, you focus on your scenario and whatever capabilities are required to restore wastewater service in that scenario, but for the rest of the SPR (free-text descriptions, gaps, etc.) you are free to think holistically about any improvements you have made or gaps that have related to any aspect of your wastewater critical infrastructure.
- Basically, the current capability can be scenario-specific (if your target is based on a specific scenario). The free-text portions are not limited to just that scenario and can describe anything related to wastewater.

12. Do the POETE (planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises) checkboxes completed as part of the assessment of capability lost, sustained, and built refer to the POETE areas in which investments were made or all actions leading to a change in capability?

- While the quantitative assessment of capability changes (completed at the top of the SPR Step 1 form) asked communities to consider all changes, the POETE checkboxes ask communities to consider specifically where sustainment and building investments were made.
- Capabilities lost should identify any POETE element where a capability was degraded, causing a capability to be lost.

13. If communities indicate a higher level of confidence in the accuracy of their capability assessment, does that imply that they will be able to deliver their estimated level of capability during an actual real-world incident?

- The confidence ratings provide additional context on the reliability of the reported capability assessments, which can be useful in both a strategic and operational context. For example, Federal planners will have a stronger sense of which information is most credible and can better understand how the data should be interpreted as they follow up with communities. In addition, it allows communities to be transparent about potential variance, and therefore more accurate in their reporting.
- FEMA recognizes that even identifying a high level of confidence in the accuracy of their capability assessment does not necessarily mean that a community will be able to deliver its estimated level of capability during an actual real-world incident.

14. What type of support should we consider for the mutual aid box? Should we consider Federal support, similar to how there was a question about the Federal government's responsibility for addressing capability gaps in the old methodology?

- FEMA's intention is that communities will use the mutual aid box to include aid from other/neighboring communities or organizations from outside the community, but this does not include Federal support or assistance.

15. One of our whole community partners is participating in our THIRA/SPR process and is willing to provide input on our assessment but doesn't want to provide specific numbers for the quantitative portions of the assessment. What should I do if a key partner isn't willing to provide that kind of information?

- A few ways that communities may be able to gather impact data, such as how many miles of road may need to be cleared following an incident, without input from a partner organization, is by using ArcGIS and ArcGIS Online, if those tools are available to them. Hazus, which is a tool that is available to download for free to state, territory, tribal, and local government agencies, may also provide more advanced analysis of impacts like the miles of road affected. Historical data from previous events or existing disaster models may also provide this information depending on the scenario. FEMA has developed a sortable list of modeling tools that are free and publicly available and posted it on Prep Toolkit on the Workshop Resources page.

- Even if a partner won't provide specific numbers, if the community can ask them to estimate their ability to respond to a THIRA scenario (THIRA Step 2), then the community can use the specifics (e.g. miles of road affected) for that scenario to develop a capability estimate for SPR Step 1. There are at least two ways to do this:

    1) They could show them their scenario and ask what percentage they think they could have addressed (e.g. how much road they could have cleared) in the defined time frame, then the calculation is just percentage of total impact. For example, if in one of their THIRA scenarios, 100 miles of road are rendered impassable by debris, and the community wants to estimate how much road they could clear in 48 hours, they would ask the Department of Transportation what percentage of that they could clear in 48 hours. If the Department of Transportation says they could clear 20% of that in 48 hours, then the community can estimate that they are able to clear 20 miles of road in 48 hours.

    2) Alternatively, they could show their scenario to their partner and ask them how long they think it would take to completely address the impact, and then prorate that based on the timeframe in their target. Sticking with our road-clearing example, if in one of their THIRA scenarios, 100 miles of road are rendered impassable by debris, the community could ask the Department of Transportation how long it would take to clear all of that. If the Department of Transportation says it would take 96 hours to clear 100 miles, the community could estimate that in 48 hours they'd be able to clear 50 miles.

- If neither of those are an option, communities should consider looking at historical performance and then modifying the estimate as best they can to reflect their chosen scenario.

- Whatever option they choose, communities should include in the free text box (the one next to the confidence rating) that a key partner for that target would not give an estimate and a brief description of how they came to the estimate they did.

SPR Step 2 Questions

16. Do the priority ratings apply to the core capability in general, the specific action described in the target, or the importance of achieving the target?

- After identifying the gap between the current capability and planning target, communities assign a priority rating (High Priority, Medium Priority, and Low Priority) to identify how important it is to meet and sustain their target level of capability.

17. Are communities obligated to complete the activities described in the Intended Approaches to Address Gaps once they include it in the SPR?

- No, describing an approach in this section does not create an obligation that the activity will be completed in the time identified. Communities should view it as a resource they can use internally to drive their strategic planning and investment strategies.

18. Are the Intended Approaches in SPR Step 2 restricted only to the actions taken to close gaps or also sustainment activities?

- Once communities have identified their capability gaps, they identify their intended approaches for addressing capability gaps or sustainment needs. This information will help communities use SPR results to drive their strategic planning and investment strategies. Communities identify approaches for sustainment or filling the capability gap(s) in the relevant POETE area and then add specific information, including:
  - Over what timeframe does this intended approach cover?
  - What activities or investments will need to occur to address the existing capability gap or support sustainment?
  - What partners may support the efforts?

19. Are communities required to identify a timeframe by which they intend to implement their Intended Approaches to Address Gaps and Sustainment Requirements? What if a community does not have a specific timeframe in mind?

- While FEMA requires communities to provide an answer to this question, they are not required to define the timing of the approach; "No defined timeframe" is also an option.

SPR Step 3 Questions

20. For the SPR Step 3 question asking how capabilities funded using Federal grants were used in a real-world incident over the past year, does the grant funding have to be from the past year alone? What type of information should we include in this free-text field? Can we include capabilities validated through exercises?

- For this portion of the assessment it does not matter when the grant funding was received as long as the capability built or sustained using that grant funding was used in a real-world incident the past year.
- FEMA recommends, to the extent reasonably available, that communities include all details that they have, including:
  - The name of the relevant grant program;
  - The year they received the funding;
  - How they used the funding to build or sustain the capability; and
  - The impact(s) the funded capability had during the incident.
- Communities should only use this free-text field to describe how they used capabilities funding with FEMA grants in a real-world incident, not in an exercise.

21. How should we approach the free-text question in SPR Step 3 if our community has not used a particular capability during a real-world incident over the past year?

- In a given year, a community may not use all their capabilities in a real-world incident. In these cases, communities should convey this in the corresponding free-text field. For example: "In 2018 we did not experience any disasters that resulted in businesses closing. As such, we did not use the Economic Recovery capability over the past year."

General THIRA/SPR Questions

1. We are finding it challenging to complete the Natural and Cultural Resources standardized target and estimate our community's current capability in this area due to a lack of data. Do you have any suggestions for developing that the standardized target and capability estimate for this capability?

- Once communities have estimated the number of natural and cultural resources (e.g. museums, landmarks, historic sites, beaches, parks) that could potentially be damaged in a disaster, they could consider which of those resources are important enough to the community that they would prioritize their restoration, regardless of whether or not they receive Federal support to do so, and create a list of those resources. Communities can use the number of resources on that list as the basis for their capability target. Communities could then consider how long it would take to restore the lowest priority item on their list. If that timeframe is acceptable to the community, then that can serve as the timeframe metric of their target. If it isn't acceptable, the community should consider what would be, and make that the timeframe metric for their target.

- To estimate their current ability to meet their target, communities should consider which items on their list they could reasonably restore on their own without Federal support, and how quickly they would be able to do so. Communities should talk to subject matter experts (e.g. parks and recreation departments, historical societies, museum curators) to help inform these estimates.

2. Are there any best practices for completing the THIRA/SPR?

- Communities can use a variety of tools and resources to complete the THIRA/SPR, and often find it beneficial to engage with partners with subject-matter expertise as well. Some communities organize one-on-one or small group meetings or interviews, while others convene working groups with subject-matter experts or plan workshops. Others gather input from stakeholders via surveys or email. There is no prescribed method for engaging with community partners and collecting data; communities should use whatever approach works best for them. Additional examples of stakeholders to engage, resources to use, and methods of engaging are discussed in the [THIRA/SPR Beginner's Guide: Getting Started](#) webinar.

3. Which portions of the THIRA/SPR do communities complete annually and which are on the three-year cycle?

- Communities will assess their capabilities every year in the SPR. Communities will only be required to update their THIRA—identifying threats and hazards, developing context descriptions, determining standardized impacts, and setting capability targets—every three years starting in 2019.

- If desired, communities can update their THIRA more frequently than every three years, however it is not required.

4. What is the process for communities that enter the THIRA/SPR cycle in an SPR-only year (e.g. 2020)?

- Communities that enter the THIRA/SPR cycle will be required to complete both the THIRA and the SPR in their first year, even if this occurs in a year where most other

communities are not required to complete a THIRA (e.g., 2020). Starting in 2019, once a community has submitted a THIRA, it will be valid for three years regardless of the year in which it was submitted. For example, if a community receives grant funding for the first time in 2020, they will be required to complete both the THIRA and SPR but will not be required to submit the THIRA again until 2023 (or the next year that they receive grant funding, if it is after 2023).

5. Does the online Unified Reporting Tool (URT) include non-required core capabilities (i.e. those from the Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation mission areas)?

▪ Yes, the online URT includes all 32 core capabilities, but only has standardized impacts and targets pre-loaded for the required core capabilities. The required core capabilities are clearly indicated in the URT. However, communities are able to complete as much or as little of the THIRA/SPR as they wish for the non-required core capabilities.

6. Communities are completing the THIRA/SPR for the Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation core capabilities for the first time using the updated methodology in 2019. How should we complete our FY 2019 Investment Justifications for projects related to these areas?

▪ Communities will complete the THIRA/SPR for core capabilities in the Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation mission areas for the first time in 2019, but not in time for the FY 2019 Investment Justifications (IJs). Therefore, communities are not expected to tie grant projects related to those areas to gaps identified in their 2019 THIRA/SPR. Instead, communities are expected to tie their FY 2019 Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation-related IJs to capability gaps identified in their 2017 THIRA/SPR (or previous THIRA/SPR if the community did not complete one in 2017).

- A timeline of how communities use their THIRA/SPR results for Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation core capabilities to complete their IJ is displayed below.

To complete the Investment Justification (IJ) for Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation core capabilities in…

FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020
	Communities use…	
2017 SPR Results	**2017 SPR Results**	**2019 SPR Results**
Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation gaps are **not assessed** in 2018 SPR	Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation gaps **are assessed** in 2019 SPR but **not in time** for the FY 2019 IJ	Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation Gaps **are assessed** in 2019 SPR **in time** for the FY 2020 IJ

7. Are UASIs expected to align their SPR data with their respective states?

- While FEMA encourages UASIs to coordinate their SPR processes with their respective states if they desire to do so, they are not required to. UASIs are required to submit a separate SPR from the state, so the data and/or collection processes can differ, if desired.

8. Does FEMA have requirements for what type of information or level of detail is included in the various SPR free-text fields?

- Communities can use the free-text descriptions in whatever way makes most sense for their assessment. Some communities may want to include a list of specific NIMS resources, while others may want bullet point highlights or multi-paragraph narratives. Community are not required to break out free text by POETE area, but are welcome to if it makes using the information more useful. Overall, FEMA encourages communities to provide all of the information required to fully capture the work they have completed and any context they wish to provide to explain their quantitative assessments.
- FEMA also provides examples of the types of content that would be appropriate in each free text box in an annotated sample THIRA/SPR.

9. Which standardized impacts and standardized targets did FEMA add in 2019 to address the Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation core capabilities?

- In 2019, FEMA released 14 new standardized targets to cover the Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation core capabilities—seven of which states, territories, and UASIs are required to complete in 2019; tribes are only required to complete one of the new targets (Cybersecurity). Reporting requirements vary for several of these targets in 2019:

  - **For Mitigation standardized targets**: Communities do not need to complete SPR Steps 1 – 3
  - **For Prevention and Protection standardized targets**: States, territories, and UASIs do not have to provide quantitative estimates of beginning capability or capability built, lost, or sustained in SPR Step 1

- Communities also do not need to indicate the most stressful threat/hazard for the following targets in THIRA Step 3:
  - Cybersecurity
  - Community Resilience
  - Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction
  - Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

- For detailed, target-by-target reporting requirements, please refer to the 2019 THIRA/SPR Target Reporting Requirements Matrix located on the [Workshop Resources](#) page of Prep Toolkit.

Core Capability	Standardized Target
Cybersecurity	Every (#) (time), appropriate authorities review and update cyber incident plans/annexes based on evolving threats covering (#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.
Intelligence and Information Sharing	During steady state, and in conjunction with the fusion center and/or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), every (#) (time), review ability to

	effectively execute the intelligence cycle, including the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information, and identify the (#) personnel assigned to support execution of the intelligence cycle. Then, within (#) (time) of the identification or notification of a credible threat, identify/analyze local context of the threat for the respective area of responsibility, and facilitate the sharing of threat information with (#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities in accordance with the intelligence cycle, and all dissemination protocols.
Interdiction and Disruption	Within (#) (time) of the identification or notification of a credible threat, conduct outreach to the fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in the community and identify (#) personnel assigned to support follow up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband.
Screening, Search, and Detection	Within (#) (time) of notice of a credible threat, conduct screening, search, and detection operations for (#) people requiring screening, including (#) people with access and functional needs (requiring screening).
Community Resilience[1]	Within (#) (time), (#) households are covered by risk-appropriate insurance, including homeowners, flood, windstorm, and seismic.
Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction	Every (#) (time), (#) jurisdictions review their building codes, and, if necessary, enact or update risk-appropriate, disaster resilient building codes.
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	Every (#) (time), after identifying threats and hazards of concern, model the impacts of (#) threat and hazard scenarios to incorporate into planning efforts.

- Within these new standardized targets, there are four new standardized impacts for which communities will estimate impact values for in THIRA Step 2:

Impact
(#) people requiring screening
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring screening)
(#) personnel (assigned to support follow-up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband)
(#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities

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[1] THSGP recipients are required to complete the Community Resilience target in 2019.

Other Questions

1. In addition to the THIRA/SPR, what assessments are communities required to complete and submit to FEMA?

- In addition to the THIRA/SPR, grant recipients of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP) are required to use the online URT to fulfill other reporting requirements.

- These reporting requirements include the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 Assessment, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Assessment, and the Urban Area Working Group (UAWG) Assessment. The specific requirements vary by grant program; these requirements are identified in the table below. Even if not required, any community can choose to complete an additional assessment if they wish.

Grant Program	Assessment Required?			
	THIRA/SPR	CPG 101	NIMS	UAWG
HSGP	✓	✓	✓	
UASI	✓	✓		✓
THSGP	✓	✓	✓	